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Inter-organizational systems (IOS) are ICT-based systems that enable organizations to share 
information and to electronically conduct business across organizational boundaries. Especially since 
the increasing availability of the Internet, there have been less technological barriers to implement IOS. 
However, that does not imply that IOS-possibilities are implemented successfully in all occasions: 
other barriers may remain. Innovation is not only a technical process of ‘solving problems’, it also 
involves economic and political processes in which interests are articulated, alliances are built and 
outcomes are struggled over. To explore this observation, this paper presents a model that helps to 
describe and analyze IOS from a power and interest perspective of multiple parties. To illustrate this 
model, eight case studies of IOS are discussed, of which two in more depth. After that, we will put the 
findings of the analysis in a broader perspective. The paper concludes with the assertion that the scope 
for the design of an effective IOS depends on a combination of technical, economic and social factors, 
which are intertwined. The model may help users to assess and discuss these factors. 
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Many organizations are at a point of change in their ability of using information technology 
to gather and use information. In the past, computerized information systems were mainly 
directed to support internal processes, but nowadays technological opportunities enable many 
businesses to implement electronic networks among suppliers, customers and other business 
partners. There are hardly any technical barriers left which are keeping organizations from 
shifting from mainly internal information systems to systems which transcend organizational 
borders and connect companies electronically with external parties. Different labels are used 
to characterize such systems, including extra-organizational systems (Howard et al., 2003), e-
commerce systems (Huang et al., 2003), e-business systems (Chaffey, 2003) and supply chain 
management systems (Shah et al., 2003). Since these systems cross organizational borders, 
we will refer to them as inter-organizational systems (IOS). 
 
Inter-organizational systems may promote major interests of organizations, e.g. by enhancing 
cost effectiveness, speed and flexibility. Other reasons for using IOS are to create new 
distribution channels and to deliver new products and services. So IOS can be used for 
improving the current way of doing business, but also for transformation or expansion 
(Straub et al., 2001). However, an IOS can also be a threat to some organizations, for 
instance, when they fear the risk of becoming more dependent on IOS partners, to be 
disintermediated or to be forced to more competitive markets where profits are lower and 
pressures are higher. For these reasons, IOS-use may alter the balance of power in inter-
organizational relationships, it could raise entry and exit barriers and shift the competitive 
position of industry participants (Webster, 1995). Consequently, an IOS may be an 
opportunity for some organizations but at the same time, for other potential IOS users it could 
be a threat. Clearly, one of the complicating issues regarding IOS is the number of 
stakeholders involved: an IOS can only function if there are two or more participating 
organizations. This means that cultural differences, conflicting interests between IOS-parties, 
unequal expectations and a heterogeneous organizational environment can be assumed to be 
critical with regard to developing, implementing and using IOS (Huang et al., 2003). 
Therefore, for parties with a clear interest in an IOS it is important to understand which 
factors are critical and which barriers may arise during the process of development, 
implementation and use. This paper aims to contribute to this understanding by presenting 
and applying a model that can be used to describe and examine IOS from an interest and 
power perspective. Based on these two perspectives, archetypes of different kinds of IOS are 
derived, of which some are more sustainable than others. In this way, the paper will provide 
suggestions on how to overcome IOS barriers and how to make an IOS more sustainable. By  3
doing so, we intend to contribute to a more effective decision-making process and project 
management with respect to the development and use of IOS.  
 
In the next sections, first, a framework will be developed based on the notion that two 
dimensions (power and interest) are of eminent importance in the process of shaping and 
applying an IOS. Starting from these two dimensions, a classification scheme is developed 
aimed to categorize the different relationships that IOS-parties can have in terms of the 
framework. This classification scheme is then used to describe and analyze various IOS-
situations by assessing the interest and power relationships among the parties. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the research findings and it addresses some implications for 
future research as well as future practice. 
 
We view the contribution of this study from three perspectives. First, this paper aims to 
advocate the emerging role of power and interest in the way in which an IOS is shaped and 
used. Clearly, this role has not yet been fully explored and hardly any articles in the area of 
IOS have addressed this issue explicitly and coherently. Second, a typology is presented for 
positioning IOS-relationships. This typology positions the power and interest that IOS-parties 
believe to have when implementing and shaping IOS and it aims to contribute to our 
understanding of key-barriers which companies are confronted with when applying IOS. 
Third, although our case data come from different organizations which are using different 
IOS, the case studies show the feasibility of analyzing IOS-relationships from a power and 
interest perspective. In this way, a contribution is made to identify more profoundly various 
issues regarding facilitators and barriers to the implementation and usage of IOS. 
 
Backgrounds 
In this study, we define inter-organizational systems that enable companies to share 
information and conduct business electronically across organizational boundaries as ICT-
based systems (Applegate et al., 2003). We mainly focus on IOS which have (or have the 
potential) to be a substantial part of the operational processes of participating organizations 
and which are directed at a frequent and structured data exchange to support business 
processes. Generally, IOS are aimed at reducing both transaction costs and organization costs 
of one or more of the companies involved in the IOS-relationship. In many cases however, 
companies also try to achieve market dominance and other strategic interests by means of 
speeding up the process of data transaction and by implementing IOS to support decision-
making processes within the company. 
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There are different types of IOS, such as systems that transcend data, money, forms, shared 
databases, messages and communication. IOS supports different functional areas and may 
augment different kinds of processes and be supported by various technologies. IOS are being 
adopted in diverse industries, such as airlines, health care, the automotive industry, banking, 
retailing, transport and others (Cavaye, 1995; Cavaye and Cragg, 1995; Short and 
Venkatraman, 1992; Swatman et al., 1994; Webster, 1995). Currently, many of these lOS are 
ordering systems and electronic markets which locally, nationally and internationally link 
organizations to suppliers, distribution channels and customers (Johnston and Vitale, 1988; 
Meier, 1995). Inter-organizational systems can be used in a 1:1, a 1:n or an n:n interaction 
pattern (Applegate et al. 2003). In this study, however, we will abstract from these different 
patterns by focusing on one particular party on both sides of an IOS. 
 
Based on our literature review (Brynjolfsson et al., 1993; Cavaye et al, 1995; Chaffey, 2003; 
Coltman et al. 2001; Davila et al., 2003; Hong et al., 2002; Howard et al., 2003; Huang et al. 
2003; Shah et al. 2002), we found the following groups of IOS inhibitors and barriers: 
1. technology-related; 
2.  ability-, awareness-, or knowledge-related; 
3. interest-related;   
4. power-related.   
Technology-related barriers refer to a lack of standards, incompatibility of software and 
hardware, problems with security, encryption and so on. Ability, awareness, or knowledge 
related barriers refer to legal barriers or to barriers related to the awareness of the 
opportunities of IOS. In some cases, also a lack of knowledge on how to apply available 
technologies inhibit companies to apply IOS. Interest-related barriers refer to the notion of 
potential IOS users that IOS does not bring enough economic and/or strategic advantages. 
Issues such as ‘risks of fraud and loss’, ‘cost justification’, ‘start up costs’, and ‘not sure of 
benefits’ are examples of interest-related IOS barriers. Power-related barriers refer to 
situations in which potential users are not able to make others use an IOS to establish 
transactions, or to situations where users have the power to ignore the IOS of a business 
partner. 
 
From the literature review on IOS facilitators and inhibitors, it can be concluded that many 
IOS barriers have already been identified, but that both the facilitators and inhibitors have 
neither been categorized in groups nor related to each other or used to develop models to 
diagnose IOS in order to overcome these barriers. In this study, we consider overcoming 
technology-related barriers (group 1) and ability-/awareness-/knowledge-related barriers 
(group 2) as pre-conditions for IOS-success. If an IOS causes too many technological  5
problems or if potential users are lacking the awareness, ability or knowledge to implement 
IOS, the IOS will not be implemented anyway. Once the preconditions are fulfilled, the 
conditions 3 (interest) and 4 (power) become relevant. In the next sections, we will focus on 
these conditions (interest and power), which means that we assume that the pre-conditions 
have been met. We emphasize however, that only if the appropriate technology is available 
and if the ability, awareness and knowledge are there, it makes sense to diagnose interest and 
power positions.  
 
A model to diagnose IOS from a interest and power perspective 
In this section, we will set out the IOS-diagnosis model by explaining its two dimensions, 
namely interest and power. 
 
Interest in IOS 
The interest of a party in an IOS can vary from low to high. In the case of low interest, the 
IOS-partner does not believe to gain much by using an IOS. With respect to applying an IOS, 
increasing operational costs, a lack of efficiency due to incompatible internal and external 
technologies and insufficient support regarding the control of the primary process are 
examples of a low interest situation. On the other hand, a high degree of interest relates to the 
perception that an IOS highly contributes to the overall goals of the company. In this study, 
we define interest as ‘perceived contribution’, which means that a party believes it will 
benefit from using an IOS and that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Within the context of 
this study, it is not relevant whether this perception can be realized or not. The perceived 
interest can constitute several elements and it is often based on economic and/or strategic 
objectives (Bendoly et al., 2004; Chen, 2003, Coltman et al., 2001). Table 1 summarizes 




Possible perceived interests in relation to IOS 
IOS will contribute to the reduction of transaction costs 
IOS will help to improve products, services, and customer satisfaction 
IOS will contribute to the optimization of internal processes 
IOS will contribute to reaching new customers and new markets 
 
Benefits of IOS will outweigh the costs 
Table 1   Possible sources of perceived interest of a party of an IOS  6
Power and IOS 
However, an IOS does not depend solely on the perceived interest of IOS users but also on 
the power relation between the involved parties. A powerful party with a clear interest in an 
IOS can apply its power to urge less powerful parties to use the IOS, independent of their 
perceived interest in the IOS (Standifera et al., 2003). At the same time, it might be rather 
difficult for parties with a high interest but with a lack of power to implement an IOS 
successfully if the other parties feel they do not have enough interest in the IOS. In this paper, 
we will define power as the capacity to exert the will over others in order to realize certain 
intended benefits (Buchanan et al., 2000). Since power is a capacity to exert one’s will, it is 
possible to indicate the source of this capacity, or in relation to IOS: parties may possess 
different sources of power to urge others to use (or not use) an IOS. Fincham (1992) suggests 
that we can view the concept of power from three perspectives: processual, institutional and 
organizational. The basis of processual power is in the social interaction between interest 
groups. Institutional structures of inequality form the external bases from which power is 
mandated to organizations. Organizational power is embedded in the internal structure of 
organizations. Since our focus is on the relations between organizations, we will focus on 
processual and institutional perspectives on power. This aproach corresponds with the work 
of Hardy (1996), who includes four dimensions of power (resource, process, meaning and 
system) into a framework. Table 2 lists some more specific sources of power which may be 
relevant in relation to IOS (Morgan, 2000; Pfeffer, 1993; Fincham, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983).  
  7
 
To realize IOS or to stop or hinder IOS realization and use, each of these sources may be used 
in isolation or in combination. In this context, power is a relational construct (French et al., 
1958), which means that parties may have a great deal or little power in relation to another 
relevant party. 
 
Using the dimensions addressed above, figure 1 depicts four situations regarding the degree 
of power and the degree of interest parties have when applying an IOS. In fact, figure 1 
captures the potential relationships between IOS-partners regarding the use of an IOS by 
focusing on the perceived interest of the IOS on the one hand, and the power balance between 











Sources of power to control IOS  Operationalization within IOS context 
 
Independent of partner organization 
 
 
If an organization is economically independent of IOS-partners (e.g. 
many small suppliers with bulk goods), its power is high. 
 
If an organization is economically dependent on the potential IOS 
partner, its power is low. 
 
 




If an organization has the formal or legal authority to force others to use 
the IOS, its power is high. 
 
If a potential IOS partner has the formal or legal authority to force the 
organization to use the IOS, the organization’s  power is low. 
 
Control over technology 
 
 
If an organization has knowledge and expertise to develop and 
implement the IOS, its power is high. 
 
If the other IOS-partner has the knowledge and expertise to develop and 
implement the IOS, the organization’s power is low. 
 
 
Inter-organizational alliances, networks 
and control of informal organization 
 
 
If the organization is influential and active in alliances with respect to 
IOS, its power is high. 
 
If the other IOS partner is not influential and active in IOS alliances, its 
power is low. 
 




Figure 1 can be used as a first step to categorize different IOS relationships. Rather than 
assigning optimal relationships, it is assumed here that when using IOS, imbalances exist 
which can be used to identify IOS barriers. Hence, the model can be used to position the 
various intended users of the IOS. If we simplify our case example by assuming that an IOS 
has two users, ten IOS-archetypes, or IOS-options, can be derived from the model (cf. figure 
2).  
In figure 2, option nr. 1 is an IOS where both users have a low degree of power and interest. 
In option nr 2, both users have a low degree of interest and a high degree of power: both are 
not interested. A shared low interest and an unequal power division characterize option nr 3. 
In option nr. 4, both users have a high degree of power and interest. Option 5 and 6 can also 
be characterized by shared interest. In the case of option number 7, a party with much power 
and interest dominates a party with a lower degree of power and interest. In case number 8, 
two parties are both lacking power, while one is interested in an IOS and the other is not. 
































Figure 2   Ten archetypes of inter-organizational systems  9
has a low interest. In option number 10, two high power parties are involved: one of the two 
is interested in an IOS, the other is not. These 10 options can be divided into three groups: 
unlikely IOS, balanced IOS and unbalanced IOS, as shown in figure 3. IOS nr. 1-3, as shown 
in figure 3, are highly unlikely, since both parties believe that they have a low interest in such 
a system.  
 
 
Such an IOS might be feasible from a technical point of view, but not from an 
economic/strategic (interest) or from a social (power) perspective. The relevant parties share 
their opinion about this. IOS nr. 4-6 show some opposite characteristics and can be addresses 
as ‘balanced’ IOS. The relevant parties both believe that they have a clear interest in an IOS. 
If that perception is stable, a balanced IOS can be developed and used. Disagreement about 
functionalities and technicalities may arise, but the very existence of the IOS is not an issue. 
IOS options number 7-10 are the more complicated archetypes, because they are unbalanced. 
In these situations, there is a party with a perceived low interest and another party with a 
perceived high interest. Depending on the respective power positions, a certain outcome can 
be expected. In a situation as shown in option number 7, the powerful party will force the 
other party to use the system. Option number 8 demands more inventiveness of the interested 
party, since both parties share a low amount of power to force the other party. Even more 
complicated is option number 9 where a low power party should ‘seduce’ a high power party 
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Figure 3   Unlikely (1-3), unbalanced (7-10) and balanced (4-6) inter-organizational 
systems 
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parties possess important sources of power but one party has a high and the other a low 
interest.  
 
It has to be emphasized here that the above-mentioned IOS options are archetypes. Clearly, in 
practice power and interest positions will be ambiguous and mixed. Perceived power and 
interest may also be dynamic in nature, which means that positions may change over time. 
Because of this, balanced IOS may become unbalanced and vice versa. This also explains 
why IOS have life cycles, since perceptions about the importance of the IOS for a company 
and the power relations among users may change. New technological opportunities or a 
changing competitive landscape could also cause these changes. 
 
The ten options addressed above assume a 1:1 IOS. However, most IOS have a 1:n of n:n 
interaction pattern. However, from the point of view of one party, e.g. a bank, the model can 




An analysis of an e-banking IOS-application for instance, shows a combination of option 
number 6, 7, and 10. One million customers believe that they have a low interest in this 
particular system, e.g. because they do not feel that the benefits will outweigh the costs. The 
customers may have the choice to move to another bank, but since other banks are 
implementing similar systems and the relative importance of these customers to each bank is 
low, this option is not very attractive. Half a million customers share the interest in the e-
banking application. These are online customers, which welcome new applications. A 
thousand customers (very profitable and important customers) do not feel an interest in the 




























Figure 4   Example: power and interest of an e-banking IOS 
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economic interest. In relation to these customers, a careful and sensitive policy has to be 
followed, since they are attractive to other banks. Parties will use different means to convince 
the other party to either use or not use the IOS. This negotiation process may also lead to 
changes in the system design, e.g. by improving compatibility and user friendliness or by 
covering installation costs. 
 
It is concluded here that IOS can be categorized by dividing participants in terms of power 
and interest. This leads to ten IOS archetypes, which can be grouped into three groups: 
unlikely, balanced and unbalanced. Each type of IOS has implications: an IOS can be ‘weak’ 
in case of relatively low interests, ‘strong’ in case of two-sided interests, or ‘one-sided’ in 
case of an unequal division of benefits. Based on such a diagnosis, the interested parties can 
develop appropriate policies to strengthen the IOS coalition. 
 
Research methodology 
The empirical part of the research is founded on eight case studies. Case data was collected 
during the period 1998-2003.  During this period, developments regarding the IOS and the 
barriers faced by companies during the implementation and use of the IOS were intensively 
studied. The initial research objective of these projects was to study under which conditions 
organizations decide to participate in developing and/or using IOS and to explore the main 
barriers with regard to applying such systems. This is a ´how´ question about a contemporary 
set of events over which the researcher has no control. It also has open and explorative 
characteristics. Consequently, a case-study approach appeared to be the most appropriate 
(Yin, 1991) and it is for this reason why we decided to conduct a multiple case study in order 
to compare different IOS and to categorize them into certain groups. In our study, we selected 
the firms from a variety of industries, such as retail, health care, transport and manufacturing 
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Table 3    IOS relations: eight case studies  13
 
 
These industries were selected to ensure substantial variance and because they included 
companies in both consumer and industrial markets.  
 
Data collection was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 involved an in-depth case study of five 
companies during a period of six months (case 2,3,5,7,8). The five companies studied were 
interested in a critical evaluation of the IOS for various reasons, including finding answers to 
questions such as: 
1)  What are the main barriers with respect to IOS-use? 
2)  Can the IOS be revised after comparison with other IOS-relationships? 
As a result of this evaluation, an improvement process was conducted in four companies 
(case 2,3,7,8). However, the nature and characteristics of these processes differed from 
making some minor improvements to significantly changing the IOS relationship with the 
other IOS partner. In two companies, changes encompassed a reorientation of the strategic 
relationship with the IOS partner (case 7,8). In the two other cases (case 2,3), some minor 
technology-oriented modifications were made as well as a reassessment of the objectives and 
goals related to the IOS being developed. During this process of change, the role of the 
researcher(s) was solely restricted to making observations, structuring on-going discussions 
and providing management with analytical, theory-based material regarding the issues that 
were being discussed. The research methodology adopted during this first phase was to 
undertake longitudinal case studies aimed at tracking the introduction of IOS over time, from 
the early decision-making stage to implementation. The methodology in other words, was 
intended to reveal the complex mechanisms behind implementing IOS  in terms of power and 
interest rather than taking a single snap shot in time. In the next section the data from two of 
these case study organizations is presented (case 7,8). Both case studies can be considered as 
illustrative examples of companies that are in the process of introducing an IOS and facing 
barriers in doing so. 
 
Phase 2 of the data collection process involved three mini-cases (case 1,4,6). In these cases, 
the research period was more condensed and included the gathering of data by means of a 
restricted number of interviews, applying open resources and a more strict focus on the model 
presented in the previous sections. The mini-cases, in other words, aimed at predicting similar 
results regarding the implementation and usage of IOS and the specific role power and 
interest play during these processes. To a certain extent, it can be argued that the three mini-
cases focused on literal replication, while the five in-depth case studies concentrated on 
producing contrasting results for predictable reasons (theoretical replication). 
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In all cases, data was gathered by studying internal reports, attending and observing meetings, 
distributing questionnaires, and conducting (semi-) structured interviews. In each 
organization, the employees who were interviewed were working at the lower, middle and 
higher management levels. In doing so, the research team aimed at collecting a broad 
perspective on the different issues related to the introduction and usage of IOS. There is no 
reason to suspect any systematic distortion in this study, and we feel that the possibility of 
random distortion was reduced in many cases by multiple interviewing.  
 
Clearly, the unit of analysis in our case studies is the IOS rather than the organizations, since 
an IOS typically covers more than one organization. For each IOS we described the 
assessment of power and interest from the perspective of (at least) two organizations. 
Although we acknowledge that we did not intend right from the beginning to conduct this 
study from a power and interest perspective, all the data gathered were carefully reassessed 
starting from the model depicted in the previous section. In some cases additional data was 
gathered, justifying the ex-post analysis of the cases presented below. Based on the model 
presented in the previous section and recognizing the role of power and interest in IOS 
implementation, several clusters of items were addressed in the empirical part of our study. 
Those relevant to the concerns of this article related to: 
-  the IOS infrastructure being adopted; 
-  the role of IOS parties involved in the decision-making process; 
-  the sources of power of the IOS-parties (cf. table 2); 
-  the perceived interests of the IOS-parties (cf. table 1). 
 
All the data gathered was reported to the main stakeholders involved in the projects by means 
of meetings, written reports and oral presentations. Furthermore, issues addressed in the 
interviews mirrored and further probed the observations, in particular regarding the role and 
influence of power and perceived interests of the IOS parties involved in the project. The 
semi-structured interviews and data from the observations provided the research team with 
crucial information about these issues and this triangulation permitted a much fuller 
interpretation of the project-reports written by the companies and data gathered by means of 
the questionnaire.  
 
Table 3 presents an overview of the eight IOS cases in terms of parties involved, assessment 
of the parties’ perceived interest, assessment of the parties’ power to realize an effective IOS, 
some very brief analyzing comments and a characterization of the IOS in terms of the model. 
Using the framework of power and interest, the next sections will include a discussion of 
some of the lessons learned. Clearly, this includes questions such as: “could the projects have  15
been more effective if the power and interest framework was used more deliberately”, “were 
important developments of IOS reflected by the framework during the dissemination of IOS”, 
and: “might a more conscious application of the framework have led to more appropriate 
interventions”. In the next section, two of the cases (case 7,8) are discussed in more detail in 
order to show how the dimensions of power and interest may have played a role in specific 
situations. This is followed by an overall analysis of the case studies including a discussion of 
some of the lessons learned. 
 
Flower Auction (FA) case 
1 
At the end of the 1990s, the Flower Auction decided to implement an IOS to link the flower 
auction directly to retailers and super markets. The Flower Auction is one of the biggest 
auctions in the world. An average of 20 m. flowers and 2 m. plants change hands every day. 
These flowers and plants are supplied by around 7000 growers worldwide, and sold to more 
than 2000 wholesalers and exporters. The Flower Auction uses an area of 1 m. sq. for 
collecting the floricultural products from the growers, organizing the auction and distributing 
the products to the buyers.  
 
Within the value chain of flowers and plants, growers are the initial suppliers. Demand comes 
from exporters, importers, wholesalers, cash & carries and retailers. Within this chain, 
auctions play the role of a mediator between growers and wholesalers. This role primarily 
consists of the collection and distribution of flori-cultural products as well as the 
determination of prices. In some cases, these prices have the status of world market prices, 
since many parties throughout the world use them as important indicators for price setting. 
The Flower Auction has a strong position in this value chain due to it size and its seemingly 
irreplaceable link between growers on the one side and the very refined and complicated 
system of distribution channels on the other side. However, the management of the auction 
perceived the rise of the Internet as a possible threat if this development was ignored by FA 
and used in innovative ways by new entrants. Management also believed that a proactive and 
strategic use of the Internet could enable FA to strengthen its position and power in the value 
chain even further. To realize such a use, FA developed an IOS application named 








This application consisted of an ordering system directed at retailers. It had to enable retailers 
to place online orders to exporters and wholesalers to be passed on to growers. The growers, 
in their turn, were to transport the products to the wholesalers who would then colllect the 
orders and take them to the retailer, e.g. the florist. By using FlowerSystem, wholesalers 
would receive the accumulated supply of all FlowerSystem growers and could offer this 
supply to the buyers. Based on the information generated by the system, growers were able to 
adjust their supply to the demand of the retailers. Until then, FA had had no direct business 
relations and information exchange with retailers. Therefore, the introduction of 
FlowerSystem can be interpreted as an attempt to redefine the value chain. Full adoption of 
the IOS-system should lead to a stronger position of FA and make the auction even more the 
leader and orchestrator of the value chain. In case of full use, all formal communication 
concerning ordering, planning and market projections could be exchanged by this system.  
The main challenge, however, was to attract retailers and wholesalers to use the system. In 
case of a high adoption by retailers, wholesalers would be urged to use FlowerSystem, but in 
case of a low adoption, they could ignore it. During the first years after implementation, only 
20% of the 1200 connected retailers made regular use of FlowerSystem; with regard to the 
returns, the share of FlowerSystem was not more than 1%. This means that FlowerSystem did 
not lead to the realization of the initial objectives. Many wholesalers and retailers seemed not 
to be prepared or willing to start using the new system. Wholesalers seemed to be reluctant to 
become too dependent on the systems of the auction, because they provided FA insight into 
profit margins and other sensitive business information.  Besides, many retailers preferred to 
look and smell flowers prior to purchase. Many of them still prefer cash & carry outlets to 
buy their flowers and plants. It also enables them to maintain personal contacts with 
colleagues, who also provide them with important market information. Only in Denmark and 
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Figure 5    Flow of activities of FlowerSystem 
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Switzerland, which have few purchasing channels for these products, FlowerSystem is 
relatively successful. Because of this low degree of adoption, FlowerSystem has mainly led to 
a cost increase for the auction, due to the development and maintenance of the system. 
 
In terms of the model, the auction had a high interest in the system. Full adoption should have 
led to lower transaction costs and to more dependency of partner organizations on FA.  The 
auciton also assumed that it possessed a high degree of power to get the system implemented 
and used. Initially, it wrongfully assumed that the partner organizations would have either a 
high degree of interest or a low degree of power or both. At that time, it was mainly focused 
on the technical realization of the system because it believed that its business partners would 
use what was offered anyway.  
 
After the introduction of the system, it seemed to be very difficult to convince the retailers to 
start using the system. Retailers had never had business relations with the auction before and 
most of them were not used to using the Internet to order their products. Many retailers also 
appreciated their relations with wholesalers, which were highly based on trust and personal 
and informal contacts. Actually, FA had not assessed the willingness of retailers to adopt the 
system in a realistic way. Many retailers proved to have the power to ignore the system; they 
did not see many advantages in it. So the actual position towards the system can be depicted 




In the current value chain, FA may have been a big and strong party but it did not have the 
power to change behaviors of buyers in other and unknown parts of the value chain. 
 
Based on the experiences of the low adoption of the FlowerSystem system, FA later 
developed IOS systems which were more aimed at their traditional partners in the value 
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Figure 6    Assessment of the relevant parties towards the 
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chain, namely the growers and wholesalers. A more collaborative approach directed at mutual 
advantage led to more successful interorganizational systems. 
 
Wholesaler - Superstore case
2 
At the end of the 1990s, after a long period of discussions and informal meetings, Wholesale 
Corp. decided to initiate a feasibility study on the design and implementation of an Inter-
organizational Information system. Wholesale Corp. is a purchasing organization 
representing independent retail formulas in the Netherlands. By means of joint purchasing, 
Wholesale Corp. is able to achieve substantial financial benefits for its members, e.g. 
supermarkets and retailers. Wholesale Corp. covers about 20% of the entire food market in 
the Netherlands. At the moment, Wholesale Corp. represents 17 affiliated members, including 
Superstore Corp. Superstore Corp. is a medium-sized chain of supermarkets consisting of 
three distribution centers and 26 stores. The company has a turnover of  	
	
employs about 2000 employees. Although many products are bought via Wholesale Corp., a 
direct and intense relationship exists between Superstore Corp. and the suppliers of both food 
and non-food products. Almost all products are directly shipped from the suppliers to the 
stores and distribution centers. As a consequence, Superstore Corp. directly orders the 
products to be delivered from the suppliers and only financial information is exchanged via 
Wholesale Corp.  
 
In 1997, Wholesale Corp. conducted a study on designing and implementing an IOS. Five 
driving forces, which still seem to be valid nowadays, triggered this study: 
-  high volumes characterize the exchange of data between Wholesale Corp. and its 
affiliated members; 
-  the food market is under high pressure to reduce costs; 
-  many supermarkets and retailers experience decreasing profit margins; 
-  supermarkets are confronted with a high competitive market forcing Wholesale Corp. to 
be more efficient; 
-  the aspect of ‘time’ is crucial in the ordering-process of food and retail products. 
 
The feasibility study mainly focused on the technical aspects of the IOS and included issues, 
such as IOS-software, the protocols to be used, the necessary technological changes to be 
made and the costs associated with implementing an overall IOS standard between Wholesale 
Corp. and its members. In 1998, Wholesale Corp. started with implementing an electronic 
procurement system which linked the ordering systems of the supermarkets and retailers to a 
                                                           
2 In order to maintain anonymity the names of the firms are not revealed in this paper. 
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central database. A substantial reduction of transaction costs, a further optimization of 
internal processes and increased service delivery levels were expected to be the main benefits 
of the IOS.  
 
The implementation of the IOS between Superstore Corp. and Wholesale Corp. was 
confronted with numerous problems. Although some of these problems seemed to be of a 
technical nature, Wholesale Corp. also faced a number of organizational difficulties in its 
communication with Superstore Corp. Project meetings were often canceled, information was 
not provided in time and pilot projects were often severely delayed. At the end of 2000, only 
a few functionalities of the IOS had been implemented and it was only partly used by 
Superstore Corp. In 2001, both Superstore Corp. and Wholesale Corp. concluded that the 
costs associated with implementing the IOS had outreached the benefits to a great extent. 
Therefore, it was decided to reassess the functionalities of the IOS and to re-design the 
administrative procedures between Superstore Corp. and Wholesale Corp. At the same time 
though, the implementation and usage of the IOS among Wholesale Corp. and some large 
supermarket chains was apparently a great success. The leading three supermarkets were all 
successfully linked to Wholesale Corp. by means of a sophisticated IOS. During the period 
1998-2001, the IOS became the subject of much discussion at Superstore Corp. At the end of 
2001, Superstore Corp. conducted a study aimed at evaluating the ongoing process of 
adopting the IOS. From this study it was concluded that technical barriers as well as a miss-fit 
between organizational procedures prevented both IOS parties to successfully implement the 
IOS. At this point in time, Superstore Corp. decided to more or less continue the IOS-project 
at a very low profile.  
 
Clearly, many aspects have contributed to the low degree of success and many different 
perspectives can be applied in trying to explain the barriers that arose during the 
implementation of the IOS between Superstore Corp. and Wholesale Corp. Starting from our 
model depicted in figure 2, the initial IOS relationship between Superstore Corp. and 
Wholesale Corp. can be categorized as a nr. 4 IOS. In a way, with respect to the IOS, both 
parties possess important of sources of power. At the start of the project, the interdependence 
between Wholesale Corp. and Superstore Corp. was strongly related to the company goals of 
Wholesale Corp. In fact, when buying products from suppliers, Wholesale Corp. was 
expected to represent the interests of its affiliated members, including Superstore Corp. As a 
consequence, Wholesale Corp. strongly favored the development and implementation of an 
IOS, which was reinforced and stimulated by an informal strategic alliance between 
Wholesale Corp. and some large supermarket chains. The ability to develop and maintain a 
complex and sophisticated IOS as well as control an influential IOS alliance consisting of  20
Wholesale Corp. and some large chains of supermarkets can be considered as the main 
sources of power of Wholesale Corp. It is tempting to classify the IOS situation of Superstore 
Corp. in 1997 as a low power situation. Superstore Corp. is one of the smaller affiliated 
members and lacks a substantial influence on the policy and decision-making processes of 
Wholesale Corp., which is dominated by the above-mentioned alliance. However, an in-depth 
analysis of the procurement situation of Superstore Corp. shows that in 1997, Superstore 
Corp. considered to renounce the procurement cooperation with Wholesale Corp. due to some 
very attractive alternatives. Moreover, Superstore Corp. informally decided that remaining 
independent of Wholesale Corp. would be of vital importance for the company to be 
competitive in the long term.  
 
At the start of the project, both Wholesale Corp. and Superstore Corp. were convinced of the 
benefits of implementing an IOS. It was expected that the IOS would be helpful in optimizing 
the internal processes of both companies and that it would significantly contribute to a 
reduction of the transaction costs. The initial IOS situation for both parties can therefore be 
categorized as being one of high power and high interest (see figure 3). However, in the 
course of the project, Superstore Corp. was confronted with an increase in costs related to the 
IOS. At the same time, the technical specifications of the IOS changed in favor of the large 
supermarkets and the dominant coalition. As a result, Superstore Corp. was not only 
confronted with expensive hardware investments but also with a very complicated 
organizational adoption process. The administrative procedures, for instance, were assumed 
to be related to scanning data from the stores. However, to Superstore Corp., this process was 
highly complicated because of the relative independent character of the stores and a lack of 
co-ordination between the ordering processes of the different stores. At the end of of the 
project, Superstore Corp. was convinced that the benefits of the IOS did not outweigh the 
costs. Consequently, the initial IOS situation of Superstore Corp. changed from a high power, 
high interest situation to a high power, low interest situation (see figure 7). 
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It is interesting to observe that the IOS relationship between Wholesale Corp. and Superstore  
Corp. can only partly be isolated from the IOS relationship which Wholesale Corp. had with 
its other members. Clearly, there was a change from a balanced IOS to an unbalanced IOS. 
This is because the IOS was closely related to the dominant alliance between Wholesale 
Corp. and some large supermarket chains. During the project, Superstore Corp. realized that 
this dominant coalition in fact dictated the technical standards and protocols as well as the 
organizational context of the IOS which was to be implemented. In 1998, a steering 
committee consisting of line managers and representatives of the board of directors of 
Superstore Corp. concluded that: 
-  designing and establishing an IOS ought to be linked to a long-term relationship with 
existing suppliers; 
-  Superstore Corp. should focus on following a differentiating leadership strategy and for 
this reason potential benefits of the IOS need to be re-assessed; 
-  the supermarkets forming part of the dominant coalition were considered to be a serious 
threat for Superstore Corp. 
 
At this point in time, Superstore Corp. was confronted with two options regarding the shaping 
of the IOS. Option one was to slowly shift to a ‘shared advantage but different power’ 
situation. In this case, Superstore Corp. would be forced to comply with IOS requirements 
defined by the dominant coalition of the procurement partnership which would probably 
result in a loss of power. Clearly, Superstore Corp. opted for becoming more independent of 
Wholesale Corp. and in doing so, it decided to comply with the disadvantage of participating 





























Figure 7  Changing perceptions of power and interest at the Superstore - 




The two case studies described in the previous section as well as the overview of the projects 
presented in table 3 outline the complexity and interlinked nature of implementing and using 
IOS. In this section, the case studies described above will be analyzed from two different 
perspectives. First, there is the apparent role of power and interest in shaping and using IOS. 
Starting from the model described in the previous sections, our analysis of the case studies 
aims at deepening our understanding of the implementation and use of IOS and of the key-
barriers which companies have to face. Following this first part of our analysis, the second 
part will look more closely at the model and address the strengths and weakness of the power 
and interest perspective suggested in this paper.  
 
Our model suggests that, based on the interest and power dimension, ten archetypes of IOS 
can be distinguished which can be grouped in balanced, unbalanced and unlikely inter-
organizational systems. Clearly, table 1 reflects this categorization by addressing both 
balanced and unbalanced IOS. It is interesting to notice, though, that different sources of 
interest and power seem to exist in the company studies. It is suggested by our case studies 
however, that the main source of power in relation to IOS is closely related to technological 
supremacy and market dominance. At the same time, power is also connected to the degree of 
interdependence among IOS parties regarding whether or not to implement and use the IOS. 
In almost all case studies, these two sources played an important role in the implementation 
of the IOS examined. In other words, the process of implementing and using IOS seems to 
imply a process of IOS parties deliberately entering into situations where they become 
dependent on each other. In some cases, the wish of co-operating parties to avoid a situation 
of mutual dependence appeared to be an important reason for not implementing or using the 
IOS. This also explains an insufficient performance of the IOS. The low degree of success in 
the Wholesale Corp. case, for instance, was mainly because Superstore Corp. was not willing 
to become dependent on Wholesale Corp. Similar to the power dimension, the interest 
dimension also appears to be heavily dominated by two specific reasons. From table 3 it can 
be derived that all companies strongly believed that IOS could contribute to the optimization 
of internal processes and the reduction of transaction costs. Apparently, optimizing internal 
processes and reducing transaction costs can therefore be considered to be the main 
stimulating reasons for companies to introduce and apply an IOS. 
 
Furthermore, the data of our case studies suggest that during the implementation and use of 
IOS several aspects gradually interacted. Especially in unbalanced situations (cf. figure 3), 
negotiations between the parties involved showed to be of a very complex and dynamic  23
nature. In other words, our case studies indicate that the outcomes of the IOS projects are 
often the result of negotiation processes rather than of a rational and linear implementation 
process. The interaction atmosphere between the parties involved in setting up and applying 
an IOS proves to be a central issue in the case of unbalanced situations. In fact, IOS in 
unbalanced situations are characterized by contradictory interests or at least by contradictory 
perceptions of interest. Our case studies show that in these cases implicit and explicit 
negotiation processes may dominate the development and implementation process. The dual 
concern model is nowadays a broadly accepted model that describes four different styles of 
negotiation behavior: problem solving, contending, yielding, and avoiding (Pruitt and 
Carnevale, 1993; Rubin et al., 1994). Problem solving occurs when negotiation parties are 
concerned with both their own and others’ goals. They openly exchange information and 
search for mutually satisfactory solutions in an active and creative way. Contending, on the 
other hand, is the effort of one party to impose its preferred solution upon the other party. 
Clearly, in those cases where one of the IOS parties has the ability to wield power, 
contending is an often-applied strategy. Yielding means adjusting to the demands of the other 
party. Avoiding means a (temporal) withdrawal from the conflict issue. During the 
implementation and setting up of the IOS, both the interest dimension and the power 
dimension heavily dictated the negotiation processes. Not only the situation of The Flower 
Auction but also the Wholesale Corp. case illustrates that during the adoption of the inter-
organizational Information system, different negotiation processes took place. This 
observation appears to be of particular importance because in literature, the political 
dimension of the introduction of information systems is often neglected (Boonstra, 2003). 
While examining the decision-making processes during the implementation of IOS, its 
political nature was revealed in at least five of the cases studied (2,3,5,7,8) and there are some 
strong indications that in unbalanced IOS negotiation behavior is the most important issue. 
 
Theory suggests that many different barriers exist regarding the introduction and use of 
(inter-organizational) information systems. These barriers are often categorized in strategic, 
processual, human and technical barriers. However, categorizing barriers into four distinctive 
groups appears to be an oversimplified reflection of reality which only partly corresponds 
with the observations made in our case studies. In the case of Wholesale Corp. for instance, 
the company faced numerous technological barriers when trying to introduce the IOS. The 
same holds for case 2 and case 3. However, in all these situations, technological barriers 
appeared to be the result of both miscommunication and the fact that parties were not 
prepared to exchange crucial information or change organizational processes in favor of the 
IOS introduced. In fact, technological shortcomings were often used as an alibi and a means 
to exert power and to influence the other IOS party. In other words, the development of  24
boundary-spanning information systems, especially in the case of unbalanced situations, is 
not only the outcome of power and political processes, in fact, power and politics is the main 
issue here. Apparently, the development of IOS tends to have a dual character which is 
closely related to the ability of IOS parties to influence behavior and outcomes.  
 
Analyzing the IOS from a power and interest perspective also indicates that both the 
dimension of power and the dimension of interest can develop in time. The situation which 
IOS-parties find themselves in is no static phenomenon but is of a dynamic nature due to 
changing circumstances and shifting perceptions of the parties involved. Sometimes, these 
changes are the result of a well-defined and explicit decision-making process. Superstore 
Corp. for instance, deliberately moved its position from a high interest, high power situation 
towards a low interest, high power situation (cf. figure 7). However, the dynamic character of 
the IOS-situation is often the result of rather implicit processes. Changing market 
circumstances (case 1), a dominant influence of the supply chain network with which parties 
fund themselves (case 6) as well as technological evolutions, such as the rise of the internet 
(case 1, 5) often contribute to a shift in positions and complicate the development and use of 
IOS. As a consequence, barriers to IOS may vary in nature and intensity during successive 
episodes. In other words, the process of developing, implementing and using IOS appears to 
be not always neat or necessarily well thought out. Moreover, the above mentioned cases 
indicate that in some situations, the implementation strategy appears to be ruled by emergent 
processes driven by perceptions of power and interest and environmental forces which are 




As information systems are increasingly applied to support links outside the organization, it 
becomes more and more crucial for management to focus on these external users. In the rush 
to implement a new system, which is sometimes driven by cost issues or other pressures on 
various parts of the organization, the interests and power of external users, such as customers, 
suppliers or other parties, are easily ignored. The danger is that the interests, needs or power 
of these groups are taken for granted, misunderstood or ignored which may lead to system 
failure, troubled relations with external parties, or other undesirable effects. 
 
Using the model outlined in this paper may help to make interests and power of relevant 
parties explicit and it may lead to rectify and change initial system specifications in order to 
improve the degree of use and the chance for success. The model may also help practitioners 
to discuss IOS-initiatives in non-technical terms: only if there is a sustainable basis in  25
strategic, economical and social terms, an IOS appears to be viable. Diagnosing IOS 
initiatives and trying to divide benefits among powerful parties prior, during and after 
implementation may prevent failure and disappointment. From this point of view, the model 
can help practitioners to be vigilant and to shift from a one dimensional, technological and 
linear approach to system implementation to a multiple perspective assessment. Approaching 
factors, such as limitations and constraints, from different perspectives may help 
organizations to affect them and to stimulate more favorable conditions for the successful 
deployment of an IOS. 
 
Applying the model also shows that implementing IOS is often a long time-scale process of 
learning and adaptation. Interest and power positions of participants may change, and so may 
new technologies and adoption rates of these technologies as well as the competitive 
environment. Because of this, the model should be used on a more continuous basis to 
describe and assess positions of parties with respect to inter organizational change processes, 
including IOS. 
 
We would also like to mention some limitations of this study and directions for further 
research. A limitation of this study is that it is based on a limited set of case studies. More in-
depth studies as well as industry specific studies may provide more insight into the specific 
interests (and degrees of interest) of parties in an IOS as well as into the means of power to 
promote, ignore or obstruct IOS initiatives of business partners. A further operationalization 
of the concepts of interest and power in relation to IOS could improve the model and make it 
more useful to academics as well as practitioners. Further research in the motives to start, 
ignore or obstruct and IOS, especially motives that go beyond management rationalism, could 
deepen our insights into the interests that are affected by IOS. Another direction for further 
research can be found in the question how companies deal with stagnating IOS and how 
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